January 24, 2016
Abstract
The
question of ethics and morality when discussing the use of unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) in warfare is to questions war itself. When is it alright to take a human life? This paper will discuss the moral and ethical
issues of UAS use in warfare. The Geneva
Convention tells us not only how to treat wounded enemy combatants, but
prohibits the killing of noncombatants.
Every conflict carries with it its own rules of engagement. To effectively employ the autonomous
capabilities of UAS, those rules of engagement must be meticulously analyzed,
and incorporated into the necessary pre-mission programming of those autonomous
systems, and clearly understood by the operators of the UAS with lesser
autonomy. Future systems may have
greater capabilities, and whether it be a UAS operator directly involved in
armed conflict, or a software programmer developing the systems to be used in
those conflicts, each must be aware of UAS capabilities, limitation, and how
they can legally, morally, and ethically be used in war.
Research: Human Factors, Ethics and Morality Introduction
Introduction
Unmanned
aerial systems (UAS) have evolved from simple target drones of the 1950s to
near fully autonomous aerial platforms carrying diverse payload ranging from
EO/IR (Electro-optical/Infra-Red), aerial imaging, weapons systems and weapons
themselves capable of long range, high altitude flight, while controlled from
thousands of miles away (Barnhart, R.,
Hottman, S., Marshall, D., and Shappee, E., pp 1 – 17). That same degree of autonomy that has been a
key to the evolution of UAS has also been the subject of concern, and criticism
of UAS by the opponents of these systems.
The authors of Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations, Harry W.,
and Linda M. Orlady point out that pilots do not do a good job of monitoring
systems when the probability of failure is low
(Orlady, H. W., and Orlady, L. M., pp 251). Another factor is that of boredom and fatigue
which may be attributed to long duration missions (Orlady, H. W., and Orlady,
L. M., pp 295). These issues may be
mitigated through training, however particularly relevant to UAS is the fact
that training requirements have not always kept up with advances in technology
(Orlady, H, W., and Orlady, L. M., pp 359).
Discussion
UAS come in a multitude of
shapes and sizes, capable of short or long endurance missions, while being
launched by hand, rail, vertical takeoff, or the classic runway just like
manned aircraft. Fahlstom, P., and
Gleason, T., provide examples of the many types of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) in their Introduction to UAV
systems (4th Ed.), illustrating the many sizes, and various
classifications according to range and endurance (pp 26). They go on to discuss the missions though
defining them is difficult because “there are so many possibilities” (pp 28). Furthering the distinctions between each UAS
is the ground control station (GCS); the human/machine interface component. In Human Factors of Remotely Operated
Vehicles, Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen, and Connor discuss the benefits of
automation, but go on to reference Billings and Woods, 1994, who point out that
the cost of unpredictability may outweigh any benefit derived from that
automation. In exploring the ethics and
morality of UAS in warfare, those costs of unpredictability must be also be addressed.
One might liken an autonomous
UAS to a landmine in that given a set of variables it will respond in a certain
way, thus UAS are often called “drones”.
Where there is a human in the loop, the human can only consider the
feedback provided by the sensors on the aircraft or those of a cooperative
platform in the mission. That
information may be insufficient.
Additionally, some may question the ethics of a weapons platform
designed to kill, while operated by a human thousands of miles away.
Considering a UAS as an
alternative to a manned observation aircraft fulfilling the role of providing
aerial imagery insights much less debate than when considering an airborne
weapons platform. In Craig Whitlock’s
The Washington Post article, “When Drones Fall From The Sky” (June 20, 2014),
the author points to more than 400 large U.S. military drone crashes as the
bases of debate on the military’s use of UAS, saying they have crashed into
home and farms. Whitman goes on to
attribute other crashes to lost-link, and pilot error. These consideration can be used to make a
strong case against UAS, in favor of manned aircraft which have a much lower
incidence of crashing, but they fail to recognize the benefits for which UAS are
exceptionally well suited; doing those
jobs that are considered dull, dirty, or dangerous. While the United States will adhere to accepted
rules of conduct in war, many of our adversaries may not, which place the
aircrew of manned aircraft in unnecessary danger. War brings with it all of those things for
which UAS are exceptionally well equipped to handle, war is dull with long
periods of inactivity between periods of intense fighting; it is dirty in
places where basic hygiene is not always possible, and the very nature of war
makes it dangerous.
Conclusion
UAS have seen an
increase in automation, but much more research and advancement is
necessary. They are currently imperfect,
and that imperfection leads to distrust (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, and
Shappee, pp 174). Greater advances in
sense and avoid, control link reliability, and navigation combined with better
crew training will result in fewer accidents, unintended casualties, and in
turn greater acceptance of UAS use in war.
Those advancements will also, in time, make UAS an alternative to manned
aircraft in a greater degree than currently seen, keeping humans free from
those dull, dirty, and dangerous jobs that are so prevalent in war.
References
- Barnhart, R.K., Hottman, S.B., Marshall, D. M., & Shappee, E, (2012), Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL.
- Billings, C. E., & Woods, D., (1994). Concerns about adaptive automation in aviation systems. In: R. Para & human performance: Current research trends (pp. 264 – 269). Hilsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Cooke, N.J., Pringel, H.L., Pedersen, H.K., and Connor, O., (2006), Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, JAI Press, Elsevier Ltd., Oxford UK, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and San Diego, CA, USA
- Fahlstrom, P.G., and Gleason, T.J., (2012), Introduction to UAS Systems (4th Ed.), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. West Sussex, UK.
- Orlady, H.W., and Orlady, L.M., Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations, (2014), Burligton, VT, USA & Surrey, England
- Whitlock, C., (June 20, 2014), When Drones Fall From The Sky, The Washington Post. Retrieved 1/22/16: http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-fall-from-the-sky/
Both
the ScanEagle, and Ikhana are capable of autonomous
flight operation, and controlled flight operations via radio link.
