Research: Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

January 24, 2016

Abstract

The question of ethics and morality when discussing the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in warfare is to questions war itself.  When is it alright to take a human life?  This paper will discuss the moral and ethical issues of UAS use in warfare.  The Geneva Convention tells us not only how to treat wounded enemy combatants, but prohibits the killing of noncombatants.  Every conflict carries with it its own rules of engagement.  To effectively employ the autonomous capabilities of UAS, those rules of engagement must be meticulously analyzed, and incorporated into the necessary pre-mission programming of those autonomous systems, and clearly understood by the operators of the UAS with lesser autonomy.  Future systems may have greater capabilities, and whether it be a UAS operator directly involved in armed conflict, or a software programmer developing the systems to be used in those conflicts, each must be aware of UAS capabilities, limitation, and how they can legally, morally, and ethically be used in war.

 

 

Research: Human Factors, Ethics and Morality Introduction

Introduction

            Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have evolved from simple target drones of the 1950s to near fully autonomous aerial platforms carrying diverse payload ranging from EO/IR (Electro-optical/Infra-Red), aerial imaging, weapons systems and weapons themselves capable of long range, high altitude flight, while controlled from thousands of miles away (Barnhart, R.,  Hottman, S., Marshall, D., and Shappee, E., pp 1 – 17).  That same degree of autonomy that has been a key to the evolution of UAS has also been the subject of concern, and criticism of UAS by the opponents of these systems.  The authors of Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations, Harry W., and Linda M. Orlady point out that pilots do not do a good job of monitoring systems when the probability of failure is low  (Orlady, H. W., and Orlady, L. M., pp 251).  Another factor is that of boredom and fatigue which may be attributed to long duration missions (Orlady, H. W., and Orlady, L. M., pp 295).  These issues may be mitigated through training, however particularly relevant to UAS is the fact that training requirements have not always kept up with advances in technology (Orlady, H, W., and Orlady, L. M., pp 359).

Discussion

UAS come in a multitude of shapes and sizes, capable of short or long endurance missions, while being launched by hand, rail, vertical takeoff, or the classic runway just like manned aircraft.  Fahlstom, P., and Gleason, T., provide examples of the many types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)  in their Introduction to UAV systems (4^th Ed.), illustrating the many sizes, and various classifications according to range and endurance (pp 26).  They go on to discuss the missions though defining them is difficult because “there are so many possibilities” (pp 28).  Furthering the distinctions between each UAS is the ground control station (GCS); the human/machine interface component.  In Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen, and Connor discuss the benefits of automation, but go on to reference Billings and Woods, 1994, who point out that the cost of unpredictability may outweigh any benefit derived from that automation.  In exploring the ethics and morality of UAS in warfare, those costs of unpredictability must be also be addressed.

One might liken an autonomous UAS to a landmine in that given a set of variables it will respond in a certain way, thus UAS are often called “drones”.  Where there is a human in the loop, the human can only consider the feedback provided by the sensors on the aircraft or those of a cooperative platform in the mission.  That information may be insufficient.  Additionally, some may question the ethics of a weapons platform designed to kill, while operated by a human thousands of miles away.

Considering a UAS as an alternative to a manned observation aircraft fulfilling the role of providing aerial imagery insights much less debate than when considering an airborne weapons platform.  In Craig Whitlock’s The Washington Post article, “When Drones Fall From The Sky” (June 20, 2014), the author points to more than 400 large U.S. military drone crashes as the bases of debate on the military’s use of UAS, saying they have crashed into home and farms.  Whitman goes on to attribute other crashes to lost-link, and pilot error.  These consideration can be used to make a strong case against UAS, in favor of manned aircraft which have a much lower incidence of crashing, but they fail to recognize the benefits for which UAS are exceptionally  well suited; doing those jobs that are considered dull, dirty, or dangerous.  While the United States will adhere to accepted rules of conduct in war, many of our adversaries may not, which place the aircrew of manned aircraft in unnecessary danger.  War brings with it all of those things for which UAS are exceptionally well equipped to handle, war is dull with long periods of inactivity between periods of intense fighting; it is dirty in places where basic hygiene is not always possible, and the very nature of war makes it dangerous.

Conclusion

UAS have seen an increase in automation, but much more research and advancement is necessary.  They are currently imperfect, and that imperfection leads to distrust (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, and Shappee, pp 174).  Greater advances in sense and avoid, control link reliability, and navigation combined with better crew training will result in fewer accidents, unintended casualties, and in turn greater acceptance of UAS use in war.  Those advancements will also, in time, make UAS an alternative to manned aircraft in a greater degree than currently seen, keeping humans free from those dull, dirty, and dangerous jobs that are so prevalent in war.

 

References

 

1. Barnhart, R.K., Hottman, S.B., Marshall, D. M., & Shappee, E, (2012), Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL.
2. Billings, C. E., & Woods, D., (1994).  Concerns about adaptive automation in aviation systems.  In: R. Para & human performance: Current research trends (pp. 264 – 269). Hilsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
3. Cooke, N.J., Pringel, H.L., Pedersen, H.K., and Connor, O., (2006), Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, JAI Press, Elsevier Ltd., Oxford UK, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and San Diego, CA, USA
4. Fahlstrom, P.G., and Gleason, T.J., (2012), Introduction to UAS Systems (4^th Ed.),  John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. West Sussex, UK.
5. Orlady, H.W., and Orlady, L.M., Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations, (2014), Burligton, VT, USA & Surrey, England
6. Whitlock, C., (June 20, 2014), When Drones Fall From The Sky, The Washington Post.  Retrieved 1/22/16:  http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-fall-from-the-sky/